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I am grateful to Marcello Guarini for the careful attention he has given “By Parity of 
Reasoning,” which I published with Brent Hudak in 1990. Thirteen years on, it is apparent that 
our account of analogical arguments harbours some obscurities that, in turn, give rise to the 
appearance if not the reality of outright error. I think that I can best honour Guarini’s 
contribution not by answering it point by point; for not even I am ready to defend the original 
paper in every particular. Better, I think, to try again and see whether Guarini’s objections have 
been satisfactorily dealt with in the retelling. 
One point of difference between then and now, is that I better appreciate the role of analogy 
in abductive reasoning, typified but not exhausted by best-explanation inferences. So in our 
present reprise, let me start there. A central task for the theorist of abduction is to elucidate the 
mechanics of hypothesis selection; in particular, he must try to answer the question of how, from 
an indefinitely large set of possibilities, only certain ones manage to qualify as candidate-
explainers.  Consider the following two schematic suggestions. 
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Darden’s Schema [Darden, 1976, p. 142] reflects Hanson’s influence, as evidenced by the 
following summary [Hanson, 1961, p. 33].        
 
Hanson’s Schema 
 
Some surprising, astonishing phenomena p1, p2, p3, ... are encountered. 
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But p1, p2, p3, ...  would not be surprising where a hypothesis of H’s type be obtained.  They 
would follow as a matter of course from something like H and would be explained by it. 
Therefore there is good reason for elaborating a hypothesis of the type of H; for proposing it 
as a possible hypothesis from whose assumption p1, p2, p3, ... might be explained. 
Darden bids of the abducer to analogize. Hanson bids him to reason from types. As it 
happens, there is a ready-built theory of analogical argument that gives instruction on both these 
matters. It is the Meta-Argument Theory of Analogical Argument (MATAA) originated in “Parity 
of Reasoning.” 
2.          The Meta Approach 
Consider (again) what may have been one of the most commented-on analogical arguments 
of the century just passed [Thomson, 1971, p. 49]. 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious 
violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney 
ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available records and 
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped 
you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your 
kidney can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of 
the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you 
— we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did and the violinist 
now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only 
for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment and can safely be 
unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this violation?  No 
doubt it would be very nice if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it?  
What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of 
the hospital says, “Tough luck, I agree, but you’ve now got to stay in bed with the 
violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this: All persons 
have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what 
happens in and to your body, but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide 
what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him.”  
Thomson develops her analogical argument as follows. If you judge The Violinist to be a 
good argument, then there is another argument similar to The Violinist that, by parity of 
reasoning, you must also judge good. This other argument (call it The Pregnancy) is one that 
concludes that maintaining a pregnancy arising from rape is not morally obligatory.  Thomson is 
here invoking, without naming it, the Fundamental Rule of Analogy, which requires that similar 
cases be treated similarly. 
What the Fundament Rule does not make clear is what the relevant similarities between The 
Violinist and The Pregnancy would consist in. This is answered by the Meta-Argument Theory 
of Analogical Argument. It would be well to bear in mind at this juncture that Darden’s schema 
has the reasoner generalizing and Hanson’s schema has the reasoner arguing from type. So 
consider the following schema, which we’ll call The Generalization. 
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The Generalization 
Human beings H1 and H2 are so related that without H2's consent, H1 has placed H2 in a state 
of vital dependency; 
 the period of dependency is indeterminate (perhaps nine months, perhaps nine years, perhaps 
forever). 
the dependency is a grievous impediment both to locomotion and to (stationary) mobility; 
the dependency constitutes a grievous invasion of privacy; 
it is an invitation to social disaster, for H2 (and H1 as well) is a laughing stock, 
it threatens H2's economic self-sufficiency; 
therefore, it would be morally permissible for H2 to terminate the vital dependency. 
 
Suppose, for present purposes, that Thomson is right in claiming parity between The Violinist 
and The Pregnancy; then MATAA furnishes the answer to what it is that these two quite different 
arguments nevertheless have in common. The MATAA proposal takes seriously the mention of 
cases in the Fundamental Rule to treat similar cases similarly. Accordingly, it is proposed that 
what The Violinist and The Pregnancy are cases of  is a common deep structure represented here 
by The Generalization. Thus an analogical argument is a meta-argument; it is an argument about 
arguments.  It is an argument in the form 
Meta-Argument 
1. Argument A posses a deep structure that provides that the premisses of A bear relation R 
to its conclusion. 
2. Argument B shares with A the same deep structure. 
3. Therefore, B possesses a deep structure that provides that its premisses likewise bear R to 
its conclusion. 
4. Hence, B is an analogue of A, A and B are good or bad arguments, by parity of reasoning, 
so-called. 
 
In our example, argument A is The Violinist.  R is a strong consequence relation.  B is The 
Pregnancy.  The deep structure is The Generalization. 
The MATAA analysis requires that the analogizer generalize on an argument whose 
assessment is already settled, and then instantiate to a different argument. To achieve the desired 
parity, it is essential that the property that the original argument is assessed as having (e.g., 
validity) is preserved by the generalization and preserved by the subsequent instantiation 
(Darden calls this “particularization”). It is well to note the significance of target property-
preservation. For ease of exposition let us agree to denote by P that property of The Violinist in 
virtue of which we regard it as a successful argument (assuming that we do). Then if the move 
from The Violinist to The Generalization is P-preserving and the instantiation from it, in turn, to 
The Pregnancy is also P-preserving, then one cannot in strict consistency ascribe P to The 
Violinist but not to The Pregnancy.  This is important. It shows that good MATAA reasoning 
makes it a requirement of consistency that The Pregnancy be given the identical evaluation as 
The Violinist, contrary to Guarini’s reservations. But let us also note in passing that this is not at 
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all the same as holding that one cannot in strict consistency accept the premisses of The 
Pregnancy and withhold or reject its conclusion. For nothing requires that the P that gets 
preserved in successful MATAA reasoning is always the property of validity.  Perhaps this is the 
source of Guarini’s confusion. 
3.          Abduction 
How does this bear on abduction? In a typical case the abducer has a target T for which he 
seeks an H such that for his belief-set ∆, ∆∪ {H}°→T.  His principal task is to find the requisite 
H. By Darden’s and Hanson’s lights, the abducer reasons his way to H by analogy. Doing so 
involves generalization and instantiation, and reasoning from type. If he proceeds in the manner 
prescribed by MATAA, the abducer looks for a distinct consequence structure 
1. ∆* ∪{H*} °→ T* 
 
that generalizes to 
2. ∆’∪ {H’} °→ T’ 
 
in ways that preserve the truth of (1). A Condition on this generalization is that the target T’ 
of the abducer’s present abduction problem instantiate the T’ of the generalization of the original 
consequence structure. He then instantiates from ∆’ and H’ to the required ∆ and H. What this 
represents is a rather commonplace situation in which there is a conclusion that you want to find 
some justification for. This is a premiss-selection task. You look for a conclusion whose sole 
similarity to your intended conclusion is that it is justified by premisses of a type (Hanson) that 
would likewise justify your intended conclusion. So you look for the requisite similarities among 
putative premisses. 
Except for tightly circumscribed situations, there are no algorithms for this that abducers 
actually execute. On the other hand, the MATAA has some powerful advantages. One is that it 
reduces analogizing to target property-preserving generalization and instantiation, which, given 
their commonness is a significantly simplifying reduction. The other that it gives some content to 
the schematic insights of Darden and Hanson. 
But what of Guarini’s other reservations, especially those that bear on the question of 
obscurity or under-exposition? The answer is that in neither the original paper of 1990 nor in this 
note have I explained the notion of deep structure and the relation of being-a-case of. Clearly, the 
familiar quantifier rules of the predicate calculus tell part of this story. Attempts to tell the other 
parts may be found in due course in The Reach of Abduction, which Dov Gabbay and I are in the 
midst of writing (Gabbay and Woods, 2004). 
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